I successfully defended my dissertation on July 8th, 2024. My advisor was David Henderson.
My dissertation journey began with an exploration of epistemic luck, primarily focusing on Duncan Pritchard's work. However, after encountering challenges and a pandemic-induced hiatus, I shifted my focus towards teaching and pedagogy. While this was a very fruitful time pedagogically speaking, I was floundering with regard to finding a dissertation topic that I was passionate about. A pivotal moment occurred when I read Ward Jones's paper, "Why do we value knowledge?", sparking a profound interest in the intersection of axiology and epistemology. This newfound passion fueled a rapid period of research and writing, culminating in a complete dissertation draft within a year and a half, ready for my advisor's review.
You can find a PDF of my dissertation here.
This dissertation answers the three value problems in epistemology. These three problems require an answer as to how knowledge is more valuable 1) than mere true belief, 2) any of the proper subsets of knowledge, and 3) in kind than that which falls short of knowledge. The methodology used to provide an answer to these problems relies on the arguments put forth in a rarely discussed paper from Ward Jones. In short, the Jonesian approach can be summed up as the view that epistemic axiology and analysis ought to be kept separate. The Jonesian framework instead looks outside of the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge to find properties of knowledge which, though contingent, can explain the distinctive value of knowledge. This framework, though remarkably robust, requires going against what I consider to be the orthodox approach to the problems. This orthodox approach relies on two axiological assumptions. The first is that every component of an analysis on knowledge must provide independent value to knowledge. The second assumption is that the value of knowledge cannot be derived from factors excluded from an analysis of knowledge. Once these assumptions are appropriately discarded, the Jonesian view has a straightforward answer to the first problem. Answering the second requires assessing Jonathan Kvanvig’s claim that a satisfied Gettier condition contributes no independent value. While I agree with Kvanvig regarding a satisfied Gettier condition, I will argue that an unsatisfied Gettier condition is not likewise neutral; it contributes disvalue. With that distinction in place, a solution to the second problem follows immediately. The third value problem, however, is a different kind of problem altogether. Answering it requires not only the Jonesian framework, but also a novel account of how we determine final value. Once this account is offered, a Jonesian answer to the tertiary problem follows immediately. This dissertation closes by applying the Jonesian framework to an argument that claims there can be no modal conditions on knowledge due to such conditions failing to help answer the value problems. This claim will be found wanting.
Chapter 1 establishes a methodological framework for approaching the value problems in epistemology. This framework, derived from Ward Jones's work, emphasizes the importance of considering contingent properties of knowledge, rather than solely focusing on necessary conditions, to explain its distinctive value. It challenges the orthodox view that the value of knowledge is solely determined by its analysis and argues for the separation of analysis and axiology.
Chapter 2 addresses Linda Zagzebski's arguments against the "machine-product model of knowledge," particularly reliabilism. It challenges her conclusion that such models fail to explain the value of knowledge and are therefore faulty. By rejecting the assumptions that the value of knowledge is solely determined by its analysis and that contingent conditions cannot contribute to its value, the chapter demonstrates that Zagzebski's arguments against the machine-product model are not decisive.
Chapter 3 delves into Jonathan Kvanvig's arguments regarding the secondary value problem, which questions why knowledge is more valuable than any of its proper subsets. Kvanvig concludes that this problem is unsolvable, leading him to shift focus from knowledge to understanding. However, the chapter argues that Kvanvig's conclusion is premature. By adapting the Jonesian framework and recognizing the negative value of an unsatisfied anti-Gettier condition, it demonstrates that knowledge can be shown to be more valuable than its proper subsets, thus challenging Kvanvig's motivation for prioritizing understanding over knowledge.
Chatper 4 explores the tertiary value problem, which seeks to explain why knowledge is not just more valuable, but also of a different kind of value than that which falls short of knowledge. It critically assesses the few existing attempts to answer this problem, though the main focus is on an answer offered by Mona Simion and Christoph Kelp. The chapter concludes that these few attempts are insufficient and proposes that a more robust account of final value is needed to address the tertiary problem adequately.
Chapter 5 focuses on Duncan Pritchard's assessment of the tertiary value problem and his argument that it is a pseudo-problem. Pritchard contends that knowledge is not finally valuable because it is not an achievement. However, the chapter challenges this conclusion by arguing that final value is primarily determined on intuitive grounds and that knowledge satisfies the criteria for final value. It proposes that Pritchard faces a dilemma: either accept that knowledge is finally valuable or reject both the final value of knowledge and his claim that achievements are finally valuable.
Chapter 6 addresses Georgi Gardiner's criticism of modal epistemology, which argues that modal conditions on knowledge fail to explain its value. By adopting the Jonesian framework and rejecting the assumptions that analysis alone determines the value of knowledge and that contingent conditions cannot contribute to it, the chapter demonstrates that the axiological limitations of modal epistemology are not a basis for its rejection. It concludes that Gardiner's criticism fails and that modal epistemology may still be a fruitful area of inquiry.